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S U M M A R Y
Prioritizing federal environmental regulation as the primary means of achieving dramatic, rapid reductions 
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions may be a strategic mistake. Regulatory mandates, particularly if based 
upon existing statutory authority, will be vulnerable to legal attack, obstruction, and delay; climate legisla-
tion can reduce legal risks and accelerate policy implementation, but only on the margin. Adopting regula-
tory controls will be immensely resource-intensive for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and other 
agencies. Even with authorizing legislation, regulatory strategies may remain more time-consuming, conflict-
ridden, and legally vulnerable than fiscal measures. A carbon tax, in particular, would be more legally secure 
and administratively easier to implement than regulatory controls on energy use and GHG emissions.
The ink on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) was scarcely dry before the legal assault on health care reform began. The first state 
lawsuit, which would eventually reach the U.S. Supreme 
Court, was literally filed the very same day President 
Barack Obama signed the PPACA into law.1 Additional 
lawsuits soon followed.2
Meaningful climate policies are certain to come under 
equally aggressive legal attack. Indeed, some opponents 
of the Obama Administration’s climate initiatives sought 
to challenge the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA’s) Clean Power Plan (CPP) before it had even been 
promulgated.3 Climate regulations, whether based on 
1. See Complaint, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV-
EMT), 2010 WL 1038209; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunc-
tive Relief, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. 
Va. 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH), 2010 WL 11240598.
2. See generally Abbe R. Gluck & Mark Regan, The Affordable Care Act’s Liti-
gation Decade, 108 Geo. L.J. 1471 (2020) (detailing the PPACA’s “decade 
in court”).
3. See In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 45 ELR 20110 (D.C. Cir. 
2015).
existing statutory authority or new legislation, will be 
assailed in court and challenged throughout the adminis-
trative process. Such measures will be vulnerable to defeat 
and delay.
There is a mismatch between the stated urgency of the 
problem and the focus on federal regulation as the domi-
nant climate policy tool. Environmental advocates and 
the Joseph Biden Administration are committed to urgent 
action on climate change. President Biden declared it a 
“moral imperative” that the nation act swiftly, and has 
called for bringing U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
below 50 percent of 2005 levels by 2030.4 Meeting this 
target will require dramatic and rapid emission reductions, 
as does the ultimate goal of stabilizing atmospheric GHG 
concentrations at a sustainable level.5 Yet, some potential 
paths forward entail significant practical obstacles and 
legal risks, particularly if the aim is to achieve emission 
reductions quickly.
Prioritizing regulatory measures over fiscal instruments 
may be a strategic mistake. Regulatory mandates, particu-
larly if based upon existing statutory authority, will be vul-
nerable to legal attack, obstruction, and delay. Even in the 
4. See Lisa Friedman, Somini Sengupta & Coral Davenport, Biden, Calling for 
Action, Commits U.S. to Halving Its Climate Emissions, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 
2021.
5. See Coral Davenport, Biden Pledges Ambitious Climate Action. Here’s What 
He Could Actually Do, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 2020; Katie Glueck & Lisa 
Friedman, Biden Announces $2 Trillion Climate Plan, N.Y. Times, July 14, 
2020.
Author’s Note: This Article is based upon a white paper 
prepared for the Niskanen Center. The author would like to 
thank those who offered comments on drafts of this Article, 
including David Bookbinder, James Coleman, Joseph Ma-
jkut, Richard Pierce, Shuting Pomerleau, Nader Sobhani, 
Steven Teles, and Christopher Walker. Any errors or omis-
sions remain the responsibility of the author.
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best of times, the control of GHG emissions through fed-
eral regulation would be a long and cumbersome process, 
requiring dozens of complex rulemakings. Yet these are not 
the best of times. Federal agencies, EPA in particular, are 
depleted of personnel and expertise.6 At the same time, a 
phalanx of economic and ideological interests, including 
state attorneys general,7 stand ready to challenge every cli-
mate policy initiative,8 and have already filed multiple such 
suits against the Biden Administration.9
A potentially hostile judiciary will further complicate 
efforts to make federal regulation a central component of 
carbon control.10
Enactment of climate legislation, expressly authorizing 
federal regulation of GHG emissions and other regula-
tory efforts to reduce the carbon intensity of the American 
economy, can reduce the legal risks and accelerate the rate 
at which such policies can be adopted and implemented, 
but only on the margin. Adopting regulatory controls sec-
tor-by-sector, technology-by-technology, will be immensely 
resource-intensive for EPA and other federal agencies. Even 
with authorizing legislation, federal regulatory strategies 
may remain more time-consuming, conflict-ridden, and 
legally vulnerable than fiscal measures. A carbon tax, in 
particular, would be more legally secure and adminis-
tratively easier to implement than regulatory controls on 
energy use and GHG emissions. In all likelihood, a nation-
wide carbon tax could be implemented in less time, and 
with less legal and administrative wrangling, than a single, 
sector-specific GHG emission standard.
6. See Umair Irfan, The Mess That Biden’s EPA Nominee Michael Regan Will 
Inherit, Explained, Vox, Feb. 8, 2021; Adam Aton, Biden Transition Team 
Says It Underestimated Trump’s Damage, Climatewire, Jan. 6, 2021; Joe 
Tollefson, Can Joe Biden Rebuild the Ravaged U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency?, Nature, Dec. 16, 2020; see also Naveena Sadasivam, Inside Biden’s 
Uphill Battle to Restore the EPA After Trump, Grist, Mar. 1, 2021, https://
grist.org/politics/epa-joe-biden-environmental-law-enforcement-trump/.
7. As six state attorneys general warned the Biden Administration in a January 
letter, “Our states have led the charge in successfully challenging unauthor-
ized and unlawful executive actions . . . You can be assured that we will do so 
again, if necessary.” Letter from Patrick Morrissey, West Virginia Attorney 
General et al., to President Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Jan. 27, 2021), https://ago.
wv.gov/Documents/2021.01.27%20Letter%20--%20President%20Biden.
pdf.
8. See Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, As Biden Vows Monumental Action on 
Climate Change, a Fight With the Fossil Fuel Industry Has Only Begun, Wash. 
Post, Jan. 29, 2021 (“as [President Biden] detailed his plans, the gas, oil 
and coal industries were already mobilizing on all fronts, . . . aiming to slow 
Biden’s unprecedented push for climate action and keep profits from fossil 
fuels flowing”).
9. See Joey Garrison & Ledyard King, 12 Republican State Attorneys General 
Sue President Biden Over Climate Change Order, USA Today, Mar. 15, 2021 
(suit filed to challenge Executive Order No. 13990 and revision of “social 
cost of carbon”); Emma Newburger, 14 GOP State Attorneys General Sue 
Biden Administration Over Oil and Gas Leasing Moratorium, CNBC, Mar. 
24, 2021 (two separate suits filed challenging moratorium on new oil and 
gas leases on federal lands and waters).
10. See, e.g., Nathan Richardson, Legal Risk Hangs Over Biden’s Climate Plans, 
Resources, Dec. 14, 2020, https://www.resources.org/common-resources/
legal-risk-hangs-over-bidens-climate-plans/; Michael B. Gerrard, 
American Constitution Society, Presidential Progress on Climate 
Change: Will the Courts Interfere With What Needs to Be Done 
to Save Our Planet? (2021); see also Samuel Moyn & Aaron Belkin, 
Take Back the Court, The Roberts Court Would Likely Strike 
Down Climate Legislation (2019).
Any meaningful climate policy will face concerted 
opposition. If climate policy is to be effective, the fact of 
such opposition, and its potential to delay and derail imple-
mentation, must be taken into account. It is often said that 
the perfect policy should not be the enemy of the good. 
It is equally true that a good policy that cannot be imple-
mented as planned is not so good after all. If the aim is to 
adopt climate policy measures that are capable of reducing 
GHG emissions quickly and sustainably, this analysis sug-
gests a carbon tax and federal spending initiatives are more 
promising than federal regulatory measures.
This Article surveys the legal vulnerabilities and admin-
istrative obstacles to the rapid adoption of regulatory mea-
sures capable of achieving meaningful GHG reductions. It 
does not purport to identify which climate policies would 
be the most effective in the abstract, or in the absence of 
administrative and legal constraints. Nor does the Article 
make any claims about what sorts of measures can pass 
the U.S. Congress now or in the future.11 Rather, it seeks 
to inform the choice of climate strategies by highlighting 
the risks faced by climate measures once they are enacted 
by Congress or promulgated by federal regulatory agencies.
I. Enacting Regulatory Measures Under 
Existing Statutory Authority
The Biden Administration has taken the reins of federal 
environmental policy after four years of concerted (though 
not always successful) efforts to roll back federal climate 
change policies. The Donald Trump Administration 
devoted substantial effort to undoing the climate policies 
of the Obama Administration.12 While no real effort was 
made to undo the endangerment finding that serves as 
the predicate for regulation of GHGs as pollutants under 
the Clean Air Act (CAA)13 (likely because any such effort 
would have failed in court14), the Trump Administration 
was able to weaken or repeal various regulatory measures, 
11. For a discussion of how a carbon tax and other fiscal measures may be ad-
opted through the budget reconciliation process, see Joseph Majkut, An-
nabelle Swift & Peter Marsters, Niskanen Center, A Carbon Tax in 
the Context of Budget Reconciliation (2021), https://www.niskanen-
center.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/A-Carbon-Tax-in-the-Context-
of-Budget-Reconcilliation.pdf.
12. See Juliet Eilperin, Brady Dennis & John Muyskens, Trump Rolled Back 
More Than 125 Environmental Safeguards. Here’s How, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 
2020; Cayli Baker, The Trump Administration’s Major Environmental Deregu-
lations, Brookings Inst., Dec. 15, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
up-front/2020/12/15/the-trump-administrations-major-environmental-
deregulations/. For a focus on the legal bases for the Trump Administration’s 
efforts to roll back regulations under the Clean Air Act (CAA), see Joseph 
Goffman & Laura Bloomer, Disempowering the EPA: How Statutory Inter-
pretation of the Clean Air Act Serves the Trump Administration’s Deregulatory 
Agenda, 70 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 929 (2020).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618.
14. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit re-
jected a legal challenge to the endangerment finding in 2012. See Coalition 
for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 684 F.3d 
102, 42 ELR 20260 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Since then, the scientific support for 
EPA’s conclusion that GHG emissions cause or contribute to air pollution 
that may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, as 
required by the CAA, has only gotten stronger. See Michael Burger, Jessica 
Wentz & Radley Horton, The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribu-
tion, 45 Colum. J. Env’t L. 57 (2020).
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including the regulation of GHG emissions from oil and 
gas development,15 regulations governing fuel economy 
and GHG emissions from motor vehicles,16 and the CPP.17 
New regulations adopted under EPA’s CAA authority to 
regulate GHGs, such as regulations on aviation-related 
emissions, were weaker than environmental advocates 
would have hoped.18
The Biden Administration has clear legal authority to 
reverse many of these regulatory initiatives, if it is willing 
to put in the time and effort required.19 Reviving some 
Obama Administration regulations (other than the CPP), 
and adopting more stringent regulations of industry-spe-
cific GHG emissions, should be possible with relatively 
little legal risk. Tightening other regulatory measures, such 
as the national ambient air quality standards for ozone or 
particulates, could yield additional GHG reductions.20 
Producing the level of emission reductions necessary to 
meet the Administration’s stated targets, on the other 
hand, will require more; and if EPA seeks to regulate GHG 
emissions more broadly under existing legal authority, its 
efforts would confront significant legal risks.
Federal agencies only have that regulatory authority del-
egated to them by Congress.21 Absent a delegation from 
Congress, agencies may not impose regulatory burdens 
or mandates on individuals, firms, or state and local gov-
ernments. This is particularly true where agencies seek to 
adopt far-reaching regulatory measures with substantial 
economic effects. As the Supreme Court has explained 
repeatedly, where Congress wants agencies to resolve ques-
tions of “deep ‘economic and political significance,’” it 
is expected to do so “expressly.”22 And where an agency 
15. See Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstruct-
ed, and Modified Sources Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 57018 (Sept. 14, 2020); Oil 
and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and 
Modified Sources Reconsideration, 85 Fed. Reg. 57398 (Sept. 15, 2020).
16. See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One 
National Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310 (Sept. 27, 2019).
17. See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions 
to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520 
(July 8, 2019). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the 
Trump Administration rules repealing the CPP and adopting an alterna-
tive, see American Lung Association v. Environmental Protection Agency, 985 
F.3d 914, 51 ELR 20009 (D.C. Cir. 2021), but this decision did not resus-
citate the CPP, and the Biden Administration has indicated it will develop 
an alternative.
18. See Nick Sobczyk, EPA Finalizes First-Ever Airplane Greenhouse Gas 
Regulations, Greenwire, Dec. 28, 2020 (noting environmental groups 
believed rules were insufficient); see also Sungjoo Ahn, EPA’s New Avia-
tion Emissions Standard: Why It’s Already Obsolete, Harv. Env’t & En-
ergy L. Program, Feb. 25, 2021, https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2021/02/
epas-aviation-emissions-standard/.
19. See Jeff Tollefson, Can Joe Biden Make Good on His Ambitious Climate 
Agenda?, Nature, Dec. 10, 2020, at 207 (discussing work load of undoing 
Trump Administration rules).
20. See Richardson, supra note 10 (noting that tightening existing regulation of 
particulate emissions would also reduce GHG emissions).
21. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is 
axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative 
regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”); see also Lou-
isiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Federal Commc’ns Comm’n, 476 U.S. 355, 
374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until 
Congress confers power upon it.”).
22. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory 
Group v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 573 U.S. 302, 323, 44 ELR 20132 
“claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded 
power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American 
economy,’” the Court will “greet its announcement with a 
measure of skepticism.”23
In 2007, the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency that GHGs constitute “pollut-
ants” subject to regulation under §202 of the CAA.24 This 
decision provided the legal basis for the Obama Admin-
istration to begin regulating GHGs under the CAA, first 
from motor vehicles (the subject of §202), and then from 
stationary sources.25 The Court’s decision made it clear that 
EPA has some authority to regulate GHG emissions, but it 
should not be overread.
Despite the broad language of Justice John Paul Stevens’ 
majority opinion in Massachusetts, it would be a mistake to 
conclude that EPA may treat GHGs as pollutants for all 
potentially relevant provisions of the CAA. The bulk of the 
CAA was drafted to provide authority for the regulation of 
traditional pollutants, such as ozone precursors and par-
ticulates. Applying these provisions to GHGs is not always 
straightforward, largely because GHGs in general, and car-
bon dioxide in particular, are so ubiquitous.26
Emission thresholds drafted for particulates and nitrogen 
oxides apply far more broadly when applied to GHGs—so 
much so that, by EPA’s own account, permitting authori-
ties would be “paralyzed” by the influx of required per-
mits.27 Specifically, EPA estimated that a strict application 
of the statutory emission thresholds for “major” stationary 
sources under CAA §165 to GHGs would increase the 
number of required air pollution permits under the Pre-
vention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program “more 
than 140-fold,” from 280 to more than 40,000 per year.28 
Subjecting GHGs to the numerical emission thresholds 
of the CAA’s omnibus permitting provisions in Title V 
would be even more burdensome, increasing the number 
of covered facilities from approximately 15,000 to around 
six million.29
The Obama Administration sought to address this con-
cern by phasing in the regulation of GHGs from stationary 
sources in ways that avoid the “absurd results” that would 
(2014) (UARG)); see also Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
23. UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 
159).
24. 549 U.S. 497, 37 ELR 20075 (2007). For a detailed and insightful look 
at the legal strategy that led to this decision, see Richard J. Lazarus, The 
Rule of Five: Climate History at the Supreme Court (2020).
25. For a discussion of how the Massachusetts decision unlocked EPA’s authority 
to regulate GHGs under the CAA, see Jody Freeman, The Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Role in U.S. Climate Policy—A Fifty Year Appraisal, 31 
Duke Env’t L. & Pol’y F. 1, 52-65 (2020); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Heat 
Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the 
Obama Administration, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 421 (2011).
26. See Freeman, supra note 25, at 56 (noting the “problem” of trying to apply 
the CAA’s provisions to GHGs).
27. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 
Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55292, 55294 (Oct. 27, 2009) (proposed rule); 
see also Freeman, supra note 25, at 56 (discussing how applying the CAA’s 
numerical emission thresholds to GHGs was “administratively unmanage-
able and politically unappealing”).
28. 74 Fed. Reg. at 55301.
29. Id. at 55295.
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be produced by applying the relevant CAA provisions, as 
written, to GHG emissions.30 Yet as the Supreme Court 
concluded, EPA lacks statutory authority to adjust the reg-
ulatory thresholds in this fashion.31
Faced with the incongruous consequences of applying 
statutory provisions designed to accommodate the regula-
tion of traditional pollutants to GHGs, the Supreme Court 
curtailed EPA’s regulatory authority. In Utility Air Regula-
tory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Court 
concluded that if relevant CAA provisions are not easily 
applied to GHGs, then GHGs should not be considered 
“pollutants” for purposes of those provisions.32 In other 
words, the CAA is not an all-purpose climate policy stat-
ute, and it may not be read that way by EPA. The fact that 
GHGs could be considered air pollutants for some portions 
of the CAA does not mean that they are pollutants within 
the meaning of other portions.33
While the Court in Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) 
allowed EPA to regulate GHG emissions from the larg-
est stationary sources—those that were already subject to 
CAA regulation—it did not allow EPA to use GHG emis-
sions as the basis for asserting regulatory authority over a 
broader swath of American industry than had previously 
been subject to federal environmental regulation. Due to 
the practical consequences of such regulation, the UARG 
Court determined it was unlikely that Congress had 
granted EPA such authority.34 Though not a reversal of the 
Massachusetts holding, UARG limits it. Equally significant, 
UARG laid the groundwork for rejecting future efforts to 
expand EPA authority over GHGs. It was, in the words 
of Harvard Law School’s Jody Freeman, “a decision laced 
with the equivalent of improvised explosive devices.”35
It did not take long for the first of those devices to go 
off. In February 2016, a majority of the Court voted to 
stay the Obama Administration’s CPP, thereby prevent-
ing it from going into effect.36 This was a highly unusual 
move, particularly as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit had already declined 
30. Id. at 55303-20; see also Freeman, supra note 25, at 56-57 (discussing EPA’s 
decision to raise the applicable thresholds administratively).
31. As one commentator noted, this rule was “a brazen attempt to evade the 
plain text of the Clean Air Act.” Nathan Richardson, The Rise and Fall of 
Clean Air Act Climate Policy, 10 Mich. J. Env’t & Admin. L. (forthcoming 
2021).
32. 573 U.S. 302, 44 ELR 20132 (2014).
33. Id. at 320:
there is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting “any air 
pollutant” in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to encom-
pass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be 
sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude those 
atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such 
vast quantities that their inclusion would radically transform those 
programs and render them unworkable as written.
34. Id. at 322 (“A brief review of the relevant statutory provisions leaves no 
doubt that the PSD program and Title V are designed to apply to, and 
cannot rationally be extended beyond, a relative handful of large sources 
capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.”).
35. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 
9, 9-10 (2015); see also Richardson, supra note 31, at 9-10 (“UARG did 
more than ‘chip away’ at Massachusetts; it limited the case to its facts: the 
single provision of the Clean Air Act at issue.”).
36. Chamber of Commerce v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 136 S. Ct. 999 
(2016) (mem.).
a stay request, and such decisions are rarely second-guessed 
by the Supreme Court.37 That action by the Court proved 
fatal for the CPP, which was stopped in its tracks before it 
could be implemented.
The Supreme Court’s stay suggested that a majority of 
the Court was skeptical of the CPP’s legality, either because 
they believed it exceeded the scope of EPA’s delegated pow-
ers or that EPA cut procedural corners when adopting the 
rule. We cannot know for sure, as there was no opinion, 
let alone a ruling on the merits.38 The stay was nonethe-
less a powerful signal that the Court was wary of how 
the Obama Administration had sought to use the CAA 
to combat climate change. Though the Court’s composi-
tion has changed since the stay was ordered, few believe 
it has become more hospitable to federal regulation in the 
interim. To the contrary, the Court is likely more conser-
vative and more skeptical of the administrative state than 
when it reviewed Obama Administration climate policies.39
Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that broad assertions of agency authority are 
disfavored. The delegation of authority to regulate is not to 
be presumed and should be based on unambiguous statu-
tory text. Where an agency seeks to assert broad regulatory 
authority over large portions of the American economy, the 
Court expects to see clear statutory authority.40 The Jus-
tices believe that questions of “deep economic and politi-
cal significance”41—so-called major questions—should 
be answered by Congress, not federal agencies.42 So, if an 
agency seeks to expand its regulatory authority, such as 
by regulating GHGs throughout the economy, the agency 
must persuade the Court that Congress authorized such 
action “expressly.” This doctrine, repeatedly embraced by 
a majority of the Justices and aggressively pushed by the 
37. As Lisa Heinzerling observed, “In staying EPA’s Clean Power Plan, the Su-
preme Court for the first time stopped a nationally applicable agency regula-
tion prior to an initial decision on the merits of the rule in a lower court.” 
Lisa Heinzerling, The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab, 28 Geo. L.J. 
425, 425 (2016).
38. This is often the consequence of Supreme Court decisions to resolve cases on 
the “shadow docket.” See generally William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme 
Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1 (2015) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s “shadow docket”).
39. For this author’s assessment of the Supreme Court’s approach to environ-
mental law questions, see Jonathan H. Adler, Which Way for the Roberts 
Court? Env’t F. (Nov.-Dec. 2020).
40. In effect, the Court has adopted a substantive canon, or “clear statement 
rule,” against finding broad delegations of authority where such delegations 
are not explicit. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 315 (2000) (describing various canons of construction against finding 
broad delegations); see also John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine 
as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223; Cass R. Sunstein, The 
American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1181 (2018).
41. UARG, 573 U.S. at 323.
42. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Response, Short-Circuiting the 
New Major Questions Doctrine, 70 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 147 (2017) (dis-
cussing the reliance upon the “major questions” doctrine in King v. Burwell); 
see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (“Although it is nominally a canon of statutory construction, we 
apply the major questions doctrine in service of the constitutional rule that 
Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by transferring that 
power to an executive agency.”).
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Chief Justice43 and Justice Brett Kavanaugh44 in partic-
ular, provides a road map for legal challenges to efforts 
by the Biden Administration to expand GHG regulation 
under the CAA without additional, explicit authorization 
from Congress.
The Biden Administration could decide to go beyond 
the repeal and replacement of Trump Administration cli-
mate-related rules, such as by seeking to adopt a CPP 2.0 or 
attempting to invoke other provisions of the CAA to target 
climate change.45 Some have urged EPA to declare carbon 
dioxide a “criteria air pollutant” for which EPA is obligated 
to set national ambient air quality standards.46 Others have 
urged the invocation of §115’s largely dormant authority to 
regulate emissions that endanger public health or welfare 
in foreign countries to authorize broad GHG regulation, 
due to the international character of climate change.47 Any 
such initiative would prompt immediate legal challenge 
and would likely face a frosty reception from the Supreme 
Court.48 The path of bold regulatory escalation would thus 
represent a particularly high-risk climate change strategy, 
even before considering the substantial effort any such ini-
tiatives would require.
II. Navigating the Administrative Process
Even where federal agencies have the unquestioned author-
ity to regulate, they may not be able to act quickly to adopt 
new rules, particularly where (as in the case of climate 
change) such regulations are certain to be subject to legal 
challenge. One reason Congress delegates authority to fed-
43. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015); City of Arlington v. Federal 
Commc’ns Comm’n, 569 U.S. 290, 312, 43 ELR 20112 (2013) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting).
44. See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (mem.), denying cert. 
to United States v. Paul, 718 F. App’x 360 (6th Cir. 2017) (statement of Ka-
vanaugh, J.); see also U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. Federal Commc’ns Comm’n, 855 
F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial 
of rehearing en banc) (stressing that “clear congressional authorization mat-
ters” for agencies to have broad regulatory authority).
45. At the time of this writing, there is some indication the Biden Administra-
tion may adopt such a course. See Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, EPA to 
Jettison Major Obama Climate Rule, as Biden Eyes a Bigger Push, Wash. Post, 
Feb. 12, 2021 (“the Biden Administration is seeking a court’s blessing to 
propose a new rule aimed at limiting greenhouse gas pollution from the na-
tion’s power plants”). Reports also indicate the Administration may consider 
a national clean energy standard. See White House Will Seek Law to Require 
Carbon-Free Power From U.S. Utilities, Reuters, Apr. 1, 2021.
46. See Center for Biological Diversity, Petition to Establish National Pollu-




47. See 42 U.S.C. §7415. For a discussion of how this provision could apply to 
GHGs, see Michael Burger, Ann E. Carlson, Michael Gerrard, Jayni Hein, 
Jason A. Schwartz & Keith J. Benes, Legal Pathways to Reducing Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Under Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, 28 Geo. Env’t L. Rev. 
359 (2016).
48. Of note, on January 19, 2021, EPA denied petitions seeking the setting 
of national ambient air quality standards for GHGs, and the regulation of 
GHGs under §§115 and 112 of the CAA. Letter from Andrew Wheeler, 
Administrator, U.S. EPA, to Kassie Siegel, Director, Center for Biological 
Diversity et al. (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/pro-
grams/climate_law_institute/pdfs/21-01-19-GHG-NAAQS-Petition-De-
nial-2021-01-19.pdf. On March 11, 2021, Acting EPA Administrator Jane 
Nishida retracted the denial. See Jean Chemnick, Whiff of the Unthinkable 
at EPA: CO2 Standards for States, Climatewire, Mar. 17, 2021.
eral regulatory agencies is because of their expertise and 
ability to incorporate new information and understand-
ing in developing regulations.49 Members of Congress 
may also prefer not to revisit individual issues on a regu-
lar basis, allowing administrative agencies to develop and 
implement policies with minimal intervention.50 It would 
be a mistake to view the regulatory process as particularly 
nimble or quick, however. Rather, as some scholars have 
noted, it can be quite “ossified.”51
Developing a significant federal regulation can take years 
of effort by agency officials. Assuming a federal agency has 
the legal authority to adopt a regulation, the agency must 
first develop a regulatory proposal. This process alone can 
take many months, if not years.52 At least one study of EPA 
rulemaking found that the amount of time the Agency 
spent developing a regulatory measure prior to proposing 
the rule could be twice as long as the time period between 
publishing a proposed rule and finalizing the rule.53
Once the regulatory proposal is ready, it is published in 
the Federal Register with a notice of proposed rulemaking. 
This notice typically triggers a comment period, during 
which affected interests and others may submit comments 
about the proposed rule, raising objections and identifying 
those portions of the proposal that are particularly good or 
particularly bad.
The proposing agency must review and respond to the 
filed comments. This too is time-consuming. It is also quite 
important. Failure to respond adequately to objections or 
concerns is a common basis upon which federal courts 
invalidate agency regulations. Thus, a responsible agency 
that wishes to see its regulation upheld in court will dili-
gently review submitted comments, address any substantive 
legal, scientific, or technical complaints, and (if necessary) 
revise the proposed rule to fix any potential problems. At 
the same time, economic and ideological interests can be 
expected to seed the comment process with all manner of 
objections, in the hope that the agency will fail to respond 
appropriately or make some other misstep.
49. See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative 
Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1097, 
1097 (2015) (“Congress establishes administrative agencies and often gives 
them substantial discretion because it lacks the expertise and political agree-
ment to resolve the policy issues that are likely to arise under a statutory 
scheme.”); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne J. O’Connell, Deadlines in Administra-
tive Law, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 923, 925-26 (2008) (“A central premise of 
the administrative state is that agencies have better information and greater 
expertise than the Congress that initially delegates authority to agencies”).
50. On the other hand, the failure of Congress to revisit and reform extant 
statutes may mean that statutes become obsolete and lose some degree of 
democratic legitimacy. See generally Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. 
Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 Iowa L. Rev. 1931 (2020).
51. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rule-
making Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992). For an overview of the debate 
over regulatory “ossification,” see Richard J. Pierce Jr., Rulemaking Ossifi-
cation Is Real: A Response to “Testing the Ossification Hypothesis,” 80 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1493 (2012).
52. See Pierce, supra note 51, at 1496 (noting EPA rulemaking may take six to 
eight years for a single rule).
53. See Wendy Wagner, Katherine Y. Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the 
Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 Admin. 
L. Rev. 99, 144 n.150 (2011). This study looked at EPA rulemaking under 
the hazardous air pollutant provisions of the CAA.
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Although agencies often have cause to revise their regu-
latory proposals in light of the comments they receive, the 
agency cannot revise the rule too much without creating a 
new set of legal vulnerabilities. A final regulation must be 
a “logical outgrowth” of the original proposal in order to 
survive legal challenge.54 If, during the comment period, 
the agency decides that a rule must undergo significant 
revision, a cautious agency will publish a supplemental 
notice and invite additional comment, further extending 
the time frame for issuing a final rule by several months, if 
not longer. Failure to supplement the rulemaking process 
in this way is often fatal to regulatory endeavors.55
Given the demands of this process, it should be no sur-
prise that the time between a notice of proposed rulemak-
ing and a final rule is typically well over one year, longer 
for particularly controversial or complex rules. At EPA, the 
average time between the initial notice and the final rule 
is over 600 days.56 In the case of the CPP, EPA initially 
published a proposed rule on June 18, 2014. This proposal, 
which filled more than 120 pages in the Federal Register, 
took months (if not years) to develop.57 After an extensive 
public comment period and public hearings, and a supple-
mental proposal published in October 2014, EPA finalized 
the rule; it was published in the Federal Register on October 
23, 2015.58 (A rule must be published in the Federal Register 
before it may take effect.) The rule never went into force, 
however, as it was stayed by the Supreme Court in Febru-
ary 2016.59 As noted above, the stay suggested that a major-
ity of Justices doubted the CPP’s legality, even after it was 
vetted through that extensive process.60
Undoing rules is no easier than adopting them. As a 
general rule, it takes at least as much time and agency 
resources to revise or undo an agency action as it did to take 
the initial action in the first place. The relevant provisions 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) apply equally 
to adopting and repealing federal regulations,61 and the 
54. See, e.g., Environmental Integrity Project v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 
425 F.3d 992, 995-98 (D.C. Cir. 2005); National Mining Ass’n v. Mine 
Safety & Health Admin., 116 F.3d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Horsehead Res. 
Dev. Co. v. Browner, 16 F.3d 1246, 24 ELR 20562 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Shell 
Oil Co. v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 950 F.2d 741, 757-63, 22 ELR 
20305 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1021-
22, 9 ELR 20284 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
55. See Wagner, Barnes & Peters, supra note 53, at 110 (“the courts have made it 
painfully clear that if a rule is to survive judicial review, it must be essentially 
in final form at the proposed rule stage”).
56. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 946 (“EPA nondeadline actions 
take an average of 685 days, versus 611 days for deadline actions.”).
57. See U.S. EPA, Fact Sheet: Settlement Agreements to Address Green-
house Gas Emissions From Electric Generating Units and Refin-
eries (2017), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2013-09/documents/settlementfactsheet.pdf (noting EPA entered into 
a settlement agreement concerning stationary source GHG regulation in 
2010 under which it committed to proposing such regulations no later than 
July 2011 and final rules no later than May 2012).
58. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (final 
rule). The procedural history of the rule is summarized in id. at 64703-04.
59. See Chamber of Commerce v. Environmental Prot. Agency, 136 S. Ct. 999 
(2016) (mem.).
60. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §551(5) (defining “rulemaking” as “agency process for 
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule”).
standard of judicial review is no more lenient for changes 
in agency position.62 In addition, as the Supreme Court 
emphasized in its decision rejecting the Trump Adminis-
tration’s attempt to undo the Deferred Action for Child-
hood Arrivals program, before changing course agencies 
must give extra attention to any reliance interests that may 
have accrued—that is, plans and investments that other 
parties made on the basis of the rules in place.63
Accordingly, the effort to repeal the CPP was nearly 
as time-consuming as had been the effort to adopt it. In 
March 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order 
instructing EPA to review and consider rescinding the CPP 
and other EPA regulations affecting the energy industry.64 
EPA issued a proposed repeal of the CPP that October.65 
Two months later, in December 2017, EPA published 
an advance notice of proposed rulemaking for a possible 
replacement of the CPP. The final rule repealing and 
replacing the CPP with the Trump Administration alter-
native was published on July 8, 2019, to take effect in Sep-
tember.66 As with the CPP, the rule faced an unwelcome 
reception in federal court, and was struck down by the 
D.C. Circuit in January 2021.67
The APA requires that agencies provide “a concise gen-
eral statement” of a regulation’s “basis and purpose.”68 In 
practice, the accompanying statement is neither concise nor 
general. To the contrary, when an agency publishes a final 
rule, the Federal Register notice may span dozens of pages. 
One hundred-plus-page notices are not uncommon, and 
are often supported by additional documentation, includ-
ing regulatory impact analyses and response to comment 
documents. The various procedural requirements may be 
excessive or unnecessary, as some scholars have argued, but 
they are what courts expect.
A successful court challenge to a federal regulation may 
require an agency to start over from scratch. Therefore, it 
behooves agencies to take their time to ensure they can 
demonstrate to a reviewing court that they acted within 
their legal authority, considered relevant matters, and 
engaged in “reasoned decision-making.” Agencies that 
62. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 42, 13 ELR 20672 (1983) (“the direction in which an agency 
chooses to move does not alter the standard of judicial review established 
by law”).
63. See Department of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. 
Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020) (“When an agency changes course, as [the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security] DHS did here, it must ‘be cognizant that long-
standing policies may have “engendered serious reliance interests that must 
be taken into account.”’” (quoting Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 
S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (cleaned up)).
64. See Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 28, 2017). See also 
Review of the Clean Power Plan, 82 Fed. Reg. 16329 (Apr. 4, 2017).
65. See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48035 (Oct. 16, 2017) 
(proposed rule).
66. See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to 
Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 34520 (July 
8, 2019) (final rule).
67. Although the three judges disagreed on the rationale, they were unanimous 
in rejecting the Trump regulation. See American Lung Ass’n v. Environmen-
tal Prot. Agency, 985 F.3d 914, 51 ELR 20009 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
68. See 5 U.S.C. §553.
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wish to see their rules upheld in court spend extra time 
ensuring that they have responded to any concerns that 
could be raised in litigation. Cutting corners in the rule-
making process increases the likelihood of a successful 
legal challenge.69
Judicial review, much like the rulemaking process, takes 
substantial time as well, often several years. Sometimes, 
courts allow regulations to take effect while review is pend-
ing, but not always, and particularly not when courts are 
made aware of serious challenges to a regulation’s legality. 
As noted above, the Supreme Court took the unusual step 
of staying the Obama Administration’s CPP, and the Court 
appears increasingly willing to consider such motions 
before high-profile cases are resolved by lower courts.70
Where one regulation serves as the predicate or comple-
ment to another regulatory initiative, the delays wrought by 
the procedural requirements and judicial review can cause 
something of a traffic jam. If an agency needs to know that 
one rule will be in place before adopting a related policy 
in a subsequent rule, it can be forced to wait while legal 
challenges to the predicate rule work their way through the 
judicial system. And if the predicate regulation is invali-
dated, the agency may have to redo that rule from scratch 
before proceeding to the next one.
As the above indicates, the rulemaking process is incred-
ibly resource-intensive for federal agencies. This limits the 
number of major rules an agency can be expected to pro-
mulgate in a given year or at a given time. In this regard, it 
is worth noting that EPA does not typically finalize more 
than seven significant regulations in a given year.71
The American economy cannot be decarbonized by issu-
ing a handful of rules, however. Each discrete regulatory 
requirement will have to navigate the process, and each 
must be based upon its own legal authority. This means 
promulgating regulations, sector-by-sector and source cat-
egory-by-source category, and revising these regulations on 
a periodic basis. This is a long, arduous road for climate 
policy to travel.
III. Authorizing Climate Regulation 
Through Legislation
Seeking to use the existing CAA to meet ambitious GHG 
reduction targets poses legal risk. Enacting climate legis-
lation can reduce some of the risks to climate regulation, 
but not all of them.72 First, and most significantly, stan-
dards and requirements enacted into law by Congress are 
not subject to the delays and legal challenges that may 
69. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 971 (noting that “when agencies 
sacrifice deliberative process” to accelerate the regulatory process, “the odds 
that existing decisions will fail” to survive judicial review increase).
70. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 
Harv. L. Rev. 123 (2019); see also Baude, supra note 38.
71. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Environmental Litiga-
tion: Impact of Deadline Suits on EPA’s Rulemaking Is Limited 9 
(2014) (GAO-15-34) (noting that EPA issued 32 major rules between May 
31, 2008, and June 1, 2013, for an average of 6.4 major rules per year).
72. See Freeman, supra note 25, at 71 (“regulation, while a powerful tool, is less 
durable than legislation”).
stall or sidetrack agency regulations. Agencies are subject 
to the requirements of reasoned decisionmaking and the 
APA. Congress is not. In addition, if Congress clearly and 
explicitly delegates authority to specific agencies to adopt 
particular types of regulations, this would prevent legal 
challenges premised on the argument that Congress has 
failed to authorize agency action, including legal chal-
lenges that would be based upon the “major questions” 
doctrine. Even better, if Congress writes relevant legal 
requirements directly into the statute, as it has sometimes 
done in revising the CAA, it would eliminate any question 
about agency authority.
While climate legislation would close the door on some 
legal challenges, many legal and administrative pitfalls 
would remain. For starters, insofar as legislation instructs 
agencies to adopt regulations, those regulations would still 
be subject to the relevant procedural requirements and 
legal challenges as are other regulatory actions. The adop-
tion of rules would still involve a time-consuming rule-
making process, and the results of any such rulemakings 
would be subject to legal challenges and delays much like 
other regulations. Further, insofar as such legislation either 
delegated broad, open-ended authority or attempted to 
conscript state governments to assist in achieving its goals, 
it would be vulnerable to other sorts of legal challenges.
Regulatory climate legislation is sure to produce a dra-
matic increase in relevant agency work loads and litiga-
tion. Consider H.R. 1512, the Climate Leadership and 
Environmental Action for Our Nation’s Future Act (aka 
CLEAN Future Act) introduced in March 2021 as an 
example.73 This proposed bill outlines a comprehensive 
regulatory strategy for shifting away from fossil fuels 
and reducing GHG emissions.74 It also envisions impos-
ing dramatic new obligations on existing agencies, the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and EPA in particu-
lar, including the issuance of dozens of new regulations 
within a very short time frame.
The CLEAN Future Act contemplates requiring EPA to 
adopt new regulations for the following, all within the first 
two years after the statute’s enactment, either alone or in 
conjunction with other agencies:
• Standards of measurement for determining the car-
bon intensity of categories of electricity-generating 
units for determining and issuing zero-emission 
electricity credits (§204);
• Standards for the safe and permanent storage of car-
bon dioxide for the purpose of issuing zero-emis-
sion electricity credits (§204);
73. See H.R. 1512, 117th Cong. (2021) (as introduced on March 2, 2021).
74. See Nick Sobczyk, Top Dems Unveil Sweeping Climate, Environmental Jus-
tice Bill, E&E News PM, Mar. 2, 2021 (“Top House Democrats today 
introduced a bill that offers an economywide outline to achieve net-zero 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, a potential starting point for the kind 
of broad climate change legislation that President Biden promised on the 
campaign trail.”).
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• Rules to ensure generating units eligible for zero-
emission electricity credits abide by applicable labor 
standards (§204);
• Measures implementing a proposed clean electricity 
standard (§210);
• Requirements for annual benchmarking submis-
sions from owners of covered buildings (§383);
• GHG emission standards for “every class or cat-
egory of new nonroad engines and new nonroad 
vehicles” (§401);
• GHG emission standards for new locomotives and 
engines used in locomotives (§401);
• GHG emission standards for new and in-service 
aircraft engines (§401);
• Standards for products and materials to be desig-
nated eligible for a federal “Buy Clean” program 
(§524);
• Injection-well standards for enhanced oil recovery 
and carbon sequestration (§621);
• Revision of the criteria for coal combustion residual 
units (§622);
• Listing of hydrogen sulfide as a hazardous air pol-
lutant (§624);
• Determination of whether drilling fluids and like 
materials are to be listed as hazardous wastes (§625);
• Revision of criteria for the receipt and handling of 
drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes 
associated with oil and gas development (§625);
• Methane emission standards for the oil and natural 
gas sector (§701);
• Prohibition of unnecessary flaring at natural gas 
wells (§702);
• Black carbon emission standards (§712);
• Standards for state preparation and submission of 
GHG emission inventories (Title VIII; Subtitle A);
• Standards for the submission of state climate plans 
for “planning period 1,” including model emission 
control strategies, governing emissions through 
2030 (Title VIII; Subtitle A);
• Minimum criteria for state climate plans and plan 
revisions that must be met before EPA review of 
state submissions (Title VIII; Subtitle A);
• Standards for carbon-sink measurement (Title 
VIII; Subtitle A);
• Standards for the implementation of the subtitle 
on product standards and producer responsibility 
(Title IX; Subtitle B).
This is a tremendous amount of regulation for a single 
agency to produce within a two-year period, particularly 
an agency (like EPA) that lacks the resources to fulfill its 
current legal obligations.
The above-listed are only a portion of what the CLEAN 
Future Act would require of EPA, however. It also requires 
EPA to promulgate additional regulations on a longer tim-
escale or without a set deadline, and further anticipates 
that EPA will be required to review and update many of 
these regulations on a periodic basis. In addition, the draft 
legislation requires EPA to review and approve (or disap-
prove) state climate plans modeled on the existing CAA 
state implementation plan process and to impose a “fed-
eral backstop carbon fee” in noncompliant states. Were 
that not enough, the draft Act further requires EPA to 
review and provide written recommendations and reviews 
of hundreds of action plans developed by federal agencies 
and their subunits every two years,75 and to issue various 
reports and analyses to guide federal climate efforts. How-
ever appealing such a strategy may be in the abstract, it 
threatens to overload EPA’s administrative and regulatory 
capacity, facilitate state resistance, and encourage exten-
sive litigation over its implementation, virtually ensuring 
that few of its goals would be achieved within the desired 
time frame.
To be sure, adopting standards directly into statute can 
protect regulatory measures against some legal challenges. 
Such standards may be more difficult to revise over time, 
however, making it harder to account for economic, tech-
nological, or environmental changes. For this reason, some 
regulatory statutes impose a first round of regulatory stan-
dards expressly, while requiring the implementing agency 
to reconsider and revise the standards on a periodic basis. 
This is a strategy that has been used in the CAA and is 
incorporated in portions of the CLEAN Future Act discus-
sion draft.
The enactment of major new regulatory legislation 
inevitably triggers a flurry of litigation as federal agencies 
begin to unpack and apply the law’s provisions. This was 
true of the 1990 CAA Amendments, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA), and the PPACA, just 
to name a few.76 As a general rule, the more complex, con-
75. The CLEAN Future Act would impose this requirement on every federal 
agency as defined in the APA. As odd as it may sound, it is not clear how 
many agencies this encompasses, as it encompasses “each authority of the 
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to 
review by another agency.” 5 U.S.C. §551(1). According to the Sourcebook 
of United States Executive Agencies, this is somewhere between 100 and 600 
separate entities. See Administrative Conference of the United States, 
Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies 12 (2d ed. 2018).
76. See Jonathan H. Adler, Of Kings to Come: The Future of Health Care Re-
form Still Remains in Federal Court, 20 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 133, 135 
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troversial, and costly a piece of legislation, the more litiga-
tion it will produce. Delegating authority to administrative 
agencies to adopt regulations implementing the statute is a 
further spur to litigation, as the promulgation of each final 
rule presents a new opportunity to file suit. After all, with 
each regulatory decision, agencies risk pleasing one set of 
interested parties while angering another. And with each 
final agency action, those upset with the results have their 
opportunity to go to court.
IV. The False Promise of Agency Deadlines
Cognizant of the potential for administrative implementa-
tion to lag, Congress often imposes deadlines for agencies 
to act.77 Environmental agencies, and EPA in particular, are 
among those subject to the greatest number of deadlines.78 
Yet the inclusion of deadlines in legislation hardly ensures 
that agencies adopt measures on the congressionally pre-
ferred schedule. To the contrary, federal regulatory agen-
cies routinely miss deadlines imposed by Congress, and 
judicial enforcement of statutory deadlines occurs after the 
fact, if at all.
According to an analysis conducted by the R Street 
Institute, federal agencies failed to meet over one-half 
of the more than 1,400 deadlines imposed by Congress 
between 1995 and 2014.79 An earlier study by law profes-
sors Jacob Gersen and Anne Joseph O’Connell reported 
even worse findings, concluding that agencies met regula-
tory deadlines less than 30% of the time between 1988 and 
2003.80 A 2011 report by Public Citizen suggested an even 
deeper problem, finding that federal regulatory agencies 
missed statutorily imposed deadlines for more than 75% of 
regulations reviewed.81 This problem has persisted. Just last 
fall, California announced its intent to sue DOE for failing 
to meet mandatory deadlines to revise energy-efficiency 
standards for 25 product categories.82
The APA authorizes suits to compel agency action that 
has been “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,”83 
yet such suits do not appear to do much to increase agency 
alacrity. A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
review of suits and settlements by EPA found little evi-
dence that such suits influenced EPA’s regulatory pri-
(2016) (discussing litigation under the 1990 CAA Amendments, ERISA, 
and PPACA).
77. See generally Kevin J. Hickey, Congressional Research Service, Agen-
cy Delay: Congressional and Judicial Means to Expedite Agency 
Rulemaking (2018).
78. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 981 tbl.2.
79. See Scott Atherley, Federal Agency Compliance With Congres-
sional Regulatory Deadlines 1 (R Street Policy Study No. 39, 2015), 
https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/RSTREET39.pdf.
80. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 949-50 n.84 (reporting “the agency 
met the deadline in only 26.99% of the cases” reviewed).
81. Public Citizen, Public Safeguards Past Due: Missed Deadlines Leave 
Public Unprotected (2012), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/up-
loads/migration/public-safeguards-past-due-report.pdf.
82. See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General of the State of California, 
Attorney General Becerra Announces Intent to Sue Energy Department 
Over Failure to Update 25 Energy Efficiency Standards (Aug. 10, 2020), 
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-announces-
intent-sue-energy-department-over-failure.
83. See 5 U.S.C. §706(1).
orities.84 Nonetheless, EPA (and the Office of Air and 
Radiation in particular) is subject to hundreds of court-
imposed deadlines.85
The Gersen-O’Connell study found that deadlines may 
increase the speed with which agencies act by approxi-
mately 100 days on average, but that this effect was not 
uniform across federal agencies, and represents only a 20% 
reduction in the time necessary to promulgate a rule.86 
In the case of EPA, which appears to be subject to more 
statutory deadlines than any other agency,87 Gersen and 
O’Connell found that actions without mandatory dead-
lines took an average of 685 days to complete. Those with 
deadlines were not completed much faster, taking an aver-
age of 610 days.88
EPA routinely misses statutorily and judicially 
imposed deadlines under the CAA. The aforementioned 
2005 GAO study found that EPA had missed 256 of 
338 statutory deadlines imposed under the 1990 CAA 
Amendments.89 In other words, EPA complied with the 
applicable statutory deadline less than 25% of the time. 
Similarly, a 2016 analysis found that EPA failed to meet 
more than 80% of the over 1,000 regulatory deadlines 
imposed under the CAA.90
On average, the required actions were late or outstand-
ing by more than four years. EPA was somewhat timely 
in meeting its obligation to review state implementation 
plans, being just under two years late on average. When it 
came to emission regulations imposed on specific industrial 
sectors, however—the sorts of rules likely to be required by 
regulatory climate change legislation—the Agency was late 
by more than 7.5 years on average.
Outside groups can sometimes file lawsuits to force 
agencies to take overdue actions.91 This is only a partial 
remedy. To take one relevant example, in December 2010, 
EPA settled a lawsuit filed by environmental groups by 
agreeing to propose new regulations governing GHG emis-
sions from new and existing power plants no later than 
July 26, 2011, and to promulgate final regulations by May 
26, 2012.92 Yet, as noted above, the resulting CPP govern-
84. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, supra note 71.
85. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 981 tbl.2.
86. Id. at 945.
87. Id. at 939 (noting EPA “faced over 1000 deadlines, more than any other 
agency” during the period under study).
88. Id. at 981 tbl.2.
89. See GAO, Clean Air Act: EPA Has Completed Most of the Actions 
Required by the 1990 Amendments, but Many Were Completed Late 
3-4 (2005) (GAO-05-613).
90. See William Yeatman, Competitive Enterprise Institute, The EPA’s 
Dereliction of Duty: How the Agency’s Failure to Meet Its Clean 
Air Act Deadlines Undermines Congressional Intent (2016), https://
cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/William-Yeatman-EPAs-Dereliction-
of-Duty.pdf.
91. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme 
Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 Duke L.J. 
819, 832 (1988) (“statutory deadlines increase the likelihood that a court 
will find an agency’s delay unreasonable and will force the agency to rem-
edy that delay”).
92. U.S. EPA, Fact Sheet: Settlement Agreements to Address Green-
house Gas Emissions From Electric Generating Units and Refin-
eries (2017), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2013-09/documents/settlementfactsheet.pdf.
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ing emissions from existing power plants was not proposed 
until 2014 and not finalized until 2015.
Agency delay is partially a function of work load and 
resources. Imposing deadlines on agencies to issue addi-
tional reports and adopt new regulations without increas-
ing the personnel and resources available to complete such 
tasks is a recipe for failure. Among other things, when 
agencies are subjected to deadlines, this may limit pub-
lic participation and compromise the quality of agency 
decisionmaking.93 The mandated tasks may eventually 
be completed, but not particularly quickly, nor is it likely 
the agency can rapidly scale up its capabilities. If speed 
matters, piling additional obligations on EPA and other 
environmental agencies does not seem like a particularly 
sensible strategy.
V. Uncooperative Federalism
Much of federal environmental law adopts a “cooperative 
federalism” framework, through which the federal govern-
ment seeks to enlist the cooperation or participation of state 
governments in the implementation and enforcement of 
environmental regulations.94 State regulatory agencies have 
more knowledge about local conditions, and may be more 
responsive to local sensitivities and concerns.95 States also 
have the “boots on the ground” to monitor and implement 
various pollution control requirements.96 Accordingly, state 
agencies are often the frontline enforcers of federal envi-
ronmental laws, and the federal EPA lacks the personnel or 
resources to substitute for or supplant state efforts.
Under existing Supreme Court jurisprudence, the fed-
eral government may not “commandeer” state governments 
to help implement a federal regulatory scheme.97 State par-
ticipation must be voluntary. Further, for cooperative fed-
eralism programs to be effective, states must be willing to 
affirmatively cooperate. Accordingly, many major environ-
mental laws offer states the promise of financial assistance 
and the threat of preemptive federal regulation as a spur to 
“cooperation.”98 The extent of such inducements is limited, 
93. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 49, at 976 (noting deadlines can 
“produce a range of negative side effects, distorting agency procedures and 
reducing the quality of decisions”); Alden F. Abbott, Case Studies in the Costs 
of Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 467, 487 
(1987) (noting deadlines may produce “hastily considered, socially ineffi-
cient rules”).
94. For a brief overview of the “cooperative federalism” model in environmen-
tal regulation, see Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of 
Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 377, 384-87 (2005); see 
also Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd: The Impact of Federal Action 
on State Environmental Regulation, 31 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 67 (2007) (ex-
ploring conflict and coordination between federal and state governments in 
environmental law).
95. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Using Federalism to Im-
prove Environmental Policy 27 (1996).
96. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Man-
dating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 
1196 (1977).
97. See, e.g., Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 
(2018); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 22 ELR 21082 (1992).
98. See Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act Uncon-
stitutional? Coercion, Cooperative Federalism and Conditional Spending After 
NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 Ecology L.Q. 671, 683 (2016).
however, as the Supreme Court has warned Congress not 
to cross the line between inducement and coercion.99
The CAA is among the federal environmental statutes 
that adopt a “cooperative federalism” model. Under the 
CAA, the federal government sets the underlying pollu-
tion and emission standards, leaving states with the pri-
mary obligation to develop plans for implementing and 
achieving the federal requirements.100 Failure to comply 
within the applicable time frame can result in the threat 
of a preemptive federal plan, increased pollution control 
requirements, and the loss of federal funds that support 
state-level environmental programs and highway construc-
tion.101 Such sanctions are not always imposed, however, as 
EPA is reluctant to take over too many state responsibilities 
or provoke too great a local backlash.102 As a consequence, 
state recalcitrance may frustrate the achievement of federal 
requirements even if such resistance does not lead to a fight 
in court.
Federal regulation of GHGs, particularly from station-
ary sources, is likely to rely on cooperative federalism to 
some degree, whether pursued under the CAA or new fed-
eral legislation. If EPA adopts federal standards for power 
plants under the CAA, as with the Obama Administra-
tion’s CPP, these standards will be implemented by state 
regulators—or at least by those willing to cooperate. Some 
states were happy to go along when the CPP was promul-
gated. Others rushed to court and eventually got the pro-
gram placed on hold.103
The proposed CLEAN Future Act would make even 
greater use of the cooperative federalism model. Title VIII 
of the proposed bill would require every state to adopt a 
state climate plan that would lead to dramatic GHG emis-
sion reductions on a set schedule until the Act’s emission 
control targets were achieved in each state. Through a sys-
tem modeled on elements of the CAA, this proposal would 
obligate states to comply or risk limits on federal projects 
within the state (under the CAA’s “conformity” provisions) 
and the imposition of a “backstop carbon fee.” Implement-
ing these provisions would require extensive rulemakings 
by EPA, and would surely invite legal challenge on the 
grounds that the threat of a carbon fee is coercive, much 
like the threat to cut off federal Medicaid funds was found 
to be in National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) 
v. Sebelius, the landmark case on the PPACA.104
Congressional efforts to induce state cooperation are 
likely to provoke serious constitutional challenge. While 
99. See, e.g., National Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) 
(NFIB) (holding that conditioning continued receipt of Medicaid funding 
on acceptance of Medicaid expansion to be unconstitutionally coercive).
100. See Adler & Stewart, supra note 98, at 682-91.
101. For a critical examination of the CAA sanctions provisions, and potential 
constitutional objections thereto, see Adler & Stewart, supra note 98.
102. The CAA authorizes the filing of citizen suits to prompt EPA enforce-
ment of the Act’s terms, including those relating to sanctions on nonco-
operating states.
103. See Lyle Denniston, States Move to Block “Clean Power Plan” (Updated), 
SCOTUSBlog, Jan. 26, 2016 (reporting officials representing 29 states 
sought a stay of the CPP from the Supreme Court).
104. 567 U.S. 519. For a discussion of how NFIB may apply to CAA programs, 
see Adler & Stewart, supra note 98, at 701-13.
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many such measures may appear constitutional under cur-
rent doctrine, much the same was said about the individ-
ual mandate when the PPACA was adopted. Many legal 
academics were dismissive of claims that the individual 
mandate, in particular, pressed against the outer bounds 
of federal constitutional authority.105 Yet five Justices 
ultimately concluded that Congress lacks the regulatory 
authority to compel individuals to purchase qualifying 
health insurance, even if Congress may impose a tax on 
the failure to purchase such insurance.106
The unprecedented nature of a federal mandate requir-
ing all individuals to purchase a specified good or service 
was part of what made the legal challenges viable. While 
some thought such a mandate was constitutionally indis-
tinguishable from other assertions of federal authority that 
had previously been upheld, five Justices concluded oth-
erwise, in part because of a perceived need to vindicate 
the principle that federal power has judicially enforceable 
limits.107 In this regard, NFIB is not an isolated example. 
Across a range of doctrines, the Supreme Court seems 
reluctant to validate the constitutionality of new assertions 
of federal regulatory authority. This was one reason the 
Court invalidated the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion, and 
it was the basis upon which the Court concluded that the 
legislatively mandated structures of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board and Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau were invalid.108
This means that unprecedented expansion of federal 
regulatory authority to address matters traditionally left in 
the hands of state or local governments, or expansions of 
existing inducements to state cooperation, are likely to be 
particularly vulnerable to constitutional challenge. Even 
those measures that may seem to fit comfortably within 
conventional understandings of existing constitutional 
doctrine may be at risk.
VI. Comparing Regulatory Strategies 
With Fiscal Alternatives
Not all climate policy initiatives are equally vulnerable to 
legal challenge and administrative delay. As a general mat-
ter, fiscal tools are less vulnerable to legal challenge than are 
regulatory measures. Subject to a few exceptions not rele-
vant here, taxpayers lack standing to challenge the legality 
105. See David A. Hyman, The Supreme Court’s PPACA Decision: Something Went 
Wrong on the Way to the Courthouse, 38 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 243, 245 
(2013) (noting “law professors were openly contemptuous of the sugges-
tion that the [PP]ACA raised serious constitutional issues”). For an overview 
of how the arguments in NFIB developed, see Josh Blackman, Unprec-
edented: The Constitutional Challenge to Obamacare (2013); see 
also Randy Barnett, Jonathan H. Adler, David E. Bernstein, Orin S. 
Kerr, David B. Kopel & Ilya Somin, A Conspiracy Against Obamacare: 
The Volokh Conspiracy and the Health Care Case (2013).
106. See NFIB, 567 U.S. 519.
107. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Conflict of Visions in NFIB v. Sebelius, 62 Drake 
L. Rev. 101 (2014).
108. See Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 
(2010); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 
(2020). See also Jonathan H. Adler, Conservative Minimalism and the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau, U. Chi. L. Rev. Online, Aug. 27, 2020, 
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/08/27/seila-adler/.
of federal spending.109 So while there may be administra-
tive hurdles to allocating and deploying resources, and 
navigating the relevant scoping, environmental impact 
assessment, and approval processes, the spending itself is 
rather immune from legal challenge.110
Taxes may be politically controversial, but they are also 
less vulnerable to legal challenge than regulatory measures, 
and are easier to implement. As illustrated by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in NFIB, the federal government has 
broader authority to impose taxes than to regulate private 
activity.111 Federal taxes on fuel consumption are clearly 
constitutional, so it is unlikely there would be any basis to 
challenge the constitutionality of a carbon tax, provided it 
was set by statute.112
A carbon tax would also be easier to implement than 
equivalent regulatory measures, or even than some sort 
of cap-and-trade regime, such as that proposed in the 
Waxman-Markey Bill in 2009. Adopting either a system 
of standards and mandates or a cap-and-trade system for 
GHGs requires making many more discrete decisions 
about regulatory design and implementation than does a 
carbon tax. Each such decision increases the complexity 
of the endeavor, and creates opportunities for rent-seeking, 
political manipulation, and, if such decisions are delegated 
to an administrative agency, administrative delay and sub-
sequent litigation.
While a tax can be designed to be relatively uniform, 
and is therefore easier to draft into legislative language, 
implementing a trading scheme necessarily requires many 
decisions about how to allocate and value allowances (e.g., 
are the allowances to be allocated by auction, lottery, or 
past behavior?). If by lottery, how is participation deter-
mined? If by past behavior, what behavior counts? What 
is the relevant time period? Is it purely retrospective, or 
partially prospective? What metric is to be used to evaluate 
comparable, but not identical, activities? Must some allow-
ances be discounted in certain sectors to account for moni-
toring or enforcement problems? And so on.113
Users of allowances are not the only ones with some-
thing to gain through rent-seeking. Those who seek to 
trade or broker allowances can also capture rents by 
influencing program design. This is true in the regula-
109. See DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (explaining general bar 
on taxpayer standing); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 
587 (2007) (noting narrow exception for some First Amendment plaintiffs).
110. On the potential administrative hurdles to green infrastructure projects, see 
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, What Happens When the Green New Deal Meets 
the Old Green Laws?, 44 Vt. L. Rev. 693 (2020).
111. See NFIB, 567 U.S. 519.
112. Former EPA General Counsel E. Donald Elliott has argued in these pages 
that EPA already has statutory authority to impose a carbon tax of sorts. See 
E. Donald Elliott, EPA’s Existing Authority to Impose a Carbon “Tax,” 49 ELR 
10919 (Oct. 2019). Any such effort by EPA would certainly provoke litiga-
tion, and raise the interesting constitutional question of whether Congress 
may delegate taxing authority to federal agencies. On the latter question, see 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Uni-
versal Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 Ind. L.J. 
239 (2005); see also James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 
114 Mich. L. Rev. 235 (2015).
113. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Prices Versus Quantities, in Policy Instruments in En-
vironmental Law 195 (Kenneth R. Richards & Josephine van Zeben eds., 
Edward Elgar 2020).
Copyright © 2021 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
51 ELR 10496 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 6-2021
tory context as well. Each discrete judgment about what 
actions or technologies will satisfy the relevant standard, 
and how standards will be implemented and enforced, 
creates an entry point for rent-seeking and manipula-
tion, as well as opportunities for litigation and delay. 
Small decisions on the margin, such as how to account 
for slight changes in fuel composition, will appear to be 
minor technical decisions, but can actually mask seri-
ous efforts to obtain economic advantage through regu-
lation.114 Carbon taxes, on the other hand, “pose fewer 
issues with administrability.”115
The degree of administrative complexity also affects 
the speed at which a climate policy can be adopted. Brit-
ish Columbia’s carbon tax system was adopted and imple-
mented in less than six months—a fraction of the time 
it typically takes EPA to adopt a single major rule. By 
comparison, it took EPA several years to draft and adopt 
the regulations implementing the CAA’s Acid Rain Pro-
gram of tradable emission allowances, even though this 
program only governed a discrete number of large pollut-
ing facilities and many key determinations, such as the 
requirements for allocating allowances, were written into 
the statute.116
114. The history of the oxygenated gasoline and reformulated gasoline programs 
under the CAA provides numerous examples of this phenomenon. See Jona-
than H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in Environmental Politics: Public 
Costs, Private Rewards (M. Greve & F. Smith eds., 1992).
115. Hsu, supra note 113, at 195.
116. See Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, Lessons Learned From Three 
Decades of Experience With Cap and Trade, 11 Rev. Env’t Econ. & Pol’y 59, 
61 (2017). The two experiences also suggest that it is far less expensive to 
administer and implement a carbon tax than to adopt a tradable permit sys-
tem. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Carbon Taxes, in Climate Change Law 431 (Daniel 
A. Farber & Marjan Peeters eds., Edward Elgar 2016).
The size and scale of the Acid Rain Program was also a 
far cry from what would be required to control emissions of 
GHGs. British Columbia’s carbon tax, on the other hand, 
was economywide and began creating incentives to reduce 
carbon use almost right away. In the United States, a car-
bon tax could “piggyback” on existing energy taxes to ease 
implementation and administration.117
VII. Conclusion
Insofar as climate change calls for quick and dramatic 
action to curb GHG emissions and clear a path toward 
ultimate atmospheric stabilization of GHGs in the atmo-
sphere, federal emission control regulation is an inadequate 
prescription. Whatever the theoretical advantages of such 
an approach, it would face significant practical obstacles, 
administrative delays, and legal vulnerabilities. Consider-
ation of the broader constitutional and administrative-law 
concerns counsels shelving federal regulatory strategies in 
favor of fiscal instruments, such as a carbon tax, that can 
be implemented quickly and with fewer legal risks. If cli-
mate change is an urgent problem, policymakers should 
choose their policy instruments accordingly.
117. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Market-Based Policy Options to Control U.S. Green-
house Gas Emissions, 23 J. Econ. Persp. 5, 21-22 (2009).
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